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ABSTRACT
CognitiveCognitive reflection is recognized as an important skill, which is
necessary for making advantageous decisions. Even though gender differences in
the Cognitive Reflection test (CRT) appear to be robust across multiple studies,
little research has examined the source of the gender gap in performance. In
Study 1, we tested the invariance of the scale across genders. In Study 2, we
investigated the role of math anxiety, mathematical reasoning, and gender in CRT
performance. The results attested the measurement equivalence of the Cognitive
Reflection Test – Long (CRT- L), when administered to male and female students.
Additionally, the results of the mediation analysis showed an indirect effect of
gender on CRT-L performance through mathematical reasoning and math
anxiety. The direct effect of gender was no longer statistically significant after
accounting for the other variables. The current findings suggest that cognitive
reflection is affected by numerical skills and related feelings.
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Introduction
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is a hugely popular mea-
sure of the tendency to avoid errors based on intuitive response tendencies,
and to rely on careful deliberation. As an example, consider the following
item: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost? çççççç cents. Although the correct response
is 5 cents, many participants give the response “10 cents”, which seems to
pop into mind effortlessly. Indeed, a remarkable property of the CRT is that
for each item, almost all participants produce either the normatively correct
response, or a typical incorrect (i.e., heuristic) response. Cognitive reflection
involves the ability to effectively monitor and correct impulsive response ten-
dencies, and it is related to a wide variety of cognitive and decision-making
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skills (e.g., Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Frederick, 2005; Koehler & James, 2010;
Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011; Toplak,
West, & Stanovich, 2014), as well as thinking dispositions (Fernbach, Rogers,
Fox, & Sloman, 2013; Fernbach, Sloman, Louis, & Shube, 2013; Mata, Fiedler,
Ferreira, & Almeida, 2013; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016;
Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012).
Frederick (2005), in his original report on the CRT, found that men outper-
formed women, and gender differences in the CRT have been confirmed in
several subsequent studies with participants from different age groups, edu-
cational levels and countries, and using the original CRT as well as modified
versions of the original test. These results are surprising, because Frederick
(2005, p. 26) described the CRT as a measure of “one type of cognitive ability”.
Given that gender differences in cognitive abilities are not commonly found,
these results raise the important question of whether the CRT measures the
same trait in men and women (i.e., whether it is an appropriate measure of
reflectivity in the case of both genders). In case the underlying trait measured
by the test is the same for both genders, an additional question is whether
the gender difference can be explained by any particular cognitive or affec-
tive factor that is related to the performance on the CRT. The aim of the cur-
rent paper was to address these questions.
Studies with adults (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Cueva et al., 2016; Pennycook,
Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016) found that males scored higher on the CRT
than females, and females gave more intuitive responses than males, while no
gender differences emerged for other types of incorrect answers that did not cor-
respond to the typical intuitive response. Campitelli and Gerrans (2014) also
showed that women struggled with inhibiting the intuitive response, especially
in the case of the “bat and ball” problem. An analogous relation between gender
and performance on the original CRT was found by Sinayev and Peters (2015)
with American adults, by Ring, Neyse, David-Barett, and Schmidt (2016), who
tested German undergraduate students, and by Albaity, Rahman, and Shahidul
(2014) whose study involved Malaysian adults from different ethnic groups.
Gender differences were also found in the case of extended versions of the
CRT. In a study conducted by Toplak et al. (2014) with Canadian university stu-
dents, male students obtained higher scores than female students, not only
on the original CRT, but also on four new items. Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Don-
ati, and Hamilton (2016) confirmed that males outperformed females on the
original CRT, and also observed a gender difference in the case of a long form
of the CRT (CRT-L), which included three new items. Their results were
obtained with Italian and British students, attending the senior year of high
school and undergraduate university courses. In sum, the studies that investi-
gated gender differences on the CRT have found that males perform better
than females on every single question, and that females are more likely to
answer none of the questions correctly (i.e., they are more likely to show very
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low levels of cognitive reflection), while males are more likely to answer all
three questions correctly (i.e., to exhibit very high levels of cognitive reflec-
tion). Importantly, gender differences persist even when controlling for test
characteristics (e.g., monetary incentives, computerized administration, stu-
dent samples, and positioning of the experiment; see Bra~nas-Garza, Kujal, &
Lenkei, 2015, for a review of 118 CRT studies).
In order to obtain an estimate of the effect size of gender differences in
cognitive reflection, we have performed a meta-analysis of studies conducted
by our research group in recent years (Morsanyi, Primi, Handley, Chiesi, & Galli,
2012; Morsanyi, Busdraghi, & Primi, 2014; Morsanyi, McCormack, & O’Mahony,
in press; Primi et al., 2016).1 Although in some of these studies we used the
CRT-L, we have only considered performance on the original CRT items, so
that we could combine scores from a larger number of studies.2 The meta-
analysis included data from 2536 participants (1611 females) from 13 sam-
ples. Most participants were undergraduate students from the UK and Italy.
Some studies also included adolescent participants, and in one study, a multi-
ple-choice version of the CRT was administered. These details are listed in
Figure 1. The analysis was conducted using the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis
software using a random-effects model (i.e., we assumed that the true effect
size of gender differences might vary from study to study). Specifically, we
expected that there might be a variation due to the heterogeneity of our sam-
ples in terms of age and level of education. The summary effect for the meta-
analysis appears in the last row of Figure 1.3 The point estimate was 0.53
Figure 1. Meta-analysis of gender differences in cognitive reflection based on studies
conducted by our research group with British and Italian participants.
1This analysis was specifically conducted for the purposes of the current paper, and has not been previ-
ously reported elsewhere. We have also included the data from the current paper in this analysis.
2In studies where we used the CRT-L, the original items were administered before the new items. For
this reason, performance on the original CRT items was not affected by the inclusion of the new items.
3Under the random-effects model, there is a distribution of true effects, and the summary effect is an
estimate of the mean of this distribution.
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(SE = 0.10, lower limit = 0.34, upper limit = 0.72), which corresponds to a
medium effect size for gender differences in cognitive reflection.
Even though gender differences in the CRT appear across multiple stud-
ies, only a few studies have examined the source of the gender gap in per-
formance. As the CRT items have mathematical content, several studies
have investigated the relationship between cognitive reflection and math-
ematical ability. Research has shown that people who perform well on the
CRT tend to perform well on numeracy tests. Specifically, significant, mod-
erate correlations have been found between performance on the CRT and
mathematical ability, as indexed by numeracy, math achievement or math
skills (r = 0.25, Gomez-Chacon, Garcıa-Madruga, Vila, Elosua, & Rodrıguez,
2014; r = 0.31, Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Primi et al., 2016; rs ranging from
0.37 to 0.51, Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; r = 0.43, Campi-
telli & Gerrans, 2014; Weller et al., 2013; r = 0.44 with numeracy and r =
0.61 with calculation, Sinayev & Peters, 2015; rs ranging from 0.29 to 0.45,
Morsanyi et al., 2014; r = 0.53, Finucane & Gullion, 2010; r = 0.58, Thomson
& Oppenheimer, 2016).
Some authors suggested that the numerical content of the CRT items
might be responsible for the gender differences. For instance, Primi
et al. (2016) found that the gender difference in the CRT-L was signifi-
cantly reduced after the effects of numeracy were controlled, and they
became non-significant when the effect of subjective numeracy was
controlled. Zhang, Highhouse, and Rada (2016) verified that gender dif-
ferences could be entirely explained by differences in subjective numer-
acy, that is, individuals’ perceived competence in dealing with
quantitative information (in other words, their self-efficacy in the quanti-
tative domain). Consistent with these findings, Thomson and Oppen-
heimer (2016) found that men outperformed females in the original
CRT, but they did not find a gender difference in their newly developed
four items that did not require any numerical computations (although
they did involve numbers).
Starting from the premise that the CRT has a significant math component,
the aim of the current study was to investigate the possibility that gender dif-
ferences were related to the numerical content of the problems. Indeed, sev-
eral studies have reported gender differences in math ability (e.g., Benbow,
Lubinski, Shea, & Eftekhari-Sanjani, 2000; Hyde, Fennema, & Lamon, 1990;
Mau & Lynn, 2000), showing that males outperformed females. Probably the
strongest evidence for the existence of gender differences in mathematics
performance comes from the Programme for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA), published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD, 2016), which assesses the competencies of 15-year-old
students from 65 different countries in various subjects, including mathemat-
ics. On average, across the OECD countries, boys outperform girls in
4 C. PRIMI ET AL.
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mathematics by eight score points.4 Between the PISA 2012 and PISA 2015
assessments, the gender gap did not change significantly in the vast majority
of countries. Nevertheless, both the existence and the nature of gender differ-
ences have been questioned. For example, Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, and Wil-
liams (2008), using data from over seven million students, found no evidence
of gender differences on US state math tests among students between grade
2 and grade 11.
Cognitive reflection has not only been found to be related to math skills,
but also to the self-assessment of feelings and perceptions concerning one’s
ability to reason about and solve mathematical tasks. For instance, perfor-
mance on the CRT was found to be significantly and positively related to par-
ticipants’ subjective perception of their quantitative abilities (r = 0.19, Primi
et al., 2016; r = 0.39, Zhang et al., 2016; ranging from 0.43 to 0.48, Liberali
et al., 2012), and it was significantly and negatively related to math anxiety
(MA) (r = ¡0.20, Morsanyi et al., 2014). MA has also been investigated across
PISA countries in the 2012 survey. The results showed that around 30% of stu-
dents reported feeling helpless or nervous when faced with math problems,
and negative feelings towards math are also associated with lower school
performance. Special attention has been paid to MA and its impact on mathe-
matical learning: an ever-growing body of research has recognised that anxi-
ety states and worry experienced during math classes or related activities are
significant factors with a negative influence on math learning and basic
numerical abilities in both adults (Bursal & Paznokas, 2006; Jameson & Fusco,
2014; Pozehl, 1996; Maloney & Beilock, 2012; McMullan, Jones, & Lea, 2010;
Swars, Daane, & Giesen, 2006) and children (Hill et al., 2016; Wu, Barth, Amin,
Malcarne, & Menon, 2012). MA thus seems to have serious consequences, not
only in the short term (on math performance at school), but also in the long
term, adversely influencing an individual’s choice of career, type of occupa-
tion and professional growth in adulthood (Ashcraft & Ridley, 2005; Beasley,
Long, & Natali, 2001; Chipman, Krantz, & Silver, 1992; Hembree, 1990; Ho
et al., 2000). Concerning gender differences, the findings generally suggest
that females suffer from MA more than males (see Else-Quest, Hyde, & Linn,
2010; and see Devine, Fawcett, Szu cs, & Dowker, 2012, for a short review),
and that women are consequently less likely to seek opportunities for math
problem solving, and they tend to avoid math-related activities (Baloglu &
Kocak, 2006; Else-Quest et al., 2010; Jain & Dowson, 2009; McGraw, Lubienski,
& Strutchens, 2006; Rubinsten, Bialik, & Solar, 2012).
Starting from these previous studies, we wanted to investigate more thor-
oughly the origin of the gender differences in cognitive reflection. Neverthe-
less, before delving into this issue, it is necessary to check the measurement
4The same report also shows a relatively large gender gap in reading in favour of girls, and negligible
gender differences in science performance.
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invariance of cognitive reflection across genders. If a test is not invariant (i.e.,
if it does not measure the same construct in the same way in different groups
of respondents), the comparison of test scores between different groups of
individuals has to be considered invalid (Waiyavutti, Johnson, & Deary, 2012).
To the best of our knowledge, so far the invariance of the CRT across gen-
ders has never been tested. That is, it is not clear if the items of the test are
suitable to measure the construct (cognitive reflection) in males as well as
females. The analysis of Differential Item Functioning (DIF) is central to the
investigation of the measurement equivalence of a scale at the item level (i.e.,
DIF allows one to assess whether the items measure the same trait dimension
when administered to two different groups). Thus, it is necessary to verify
that the structure of the test, and item functioning is the same amongst male
and female samples, in order to ascertain that the documented gender differ-
ences are due to real differences among males and females and not the result
of biases in item functioning.
In sum, the aim of Study 1 was to provide evidence of the gender invari-
ance of the CRT-L, a new version of the CRT, which was recently developed in
order to obtain a valid and reliable instrument, which overcomes some of the
limitations of the original three-item CRT (Primi et al., 2016). If the CRT-L is
invariant across genders, observed scores depend only on the levels of the
latent construct, and not on group membership, and observed differences
between groups reflect true differences in the amount or variability of the
construct. With these premises, Study 2 sought to investigate the possibility
that gender differences were related to the numerical content of the prob-
lems. In particular, we tested the hypothesis that math skills and MA
explained gender differences in cognitive reflection.
Study 1
When comparing groups, researchers assume that the instrument (question-
naire, ability test) that they employ measures the same construct in all groups.
Despite its appeal and its practical significance, this assumption is often not
justified and needs to be tested. If the test does not measure the same con-
struct across different groups, results are not comparable and inferences
about group differences are misleading. The general term used to describe
the lack of correspondence between measures applied to different groups is
bias (Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1997). Measurement equivalence might be
threatened by different forms of bias. Item bias refers to differences in item-
level responses that occur when items function differently for certain groups
of respondents. For example, items are biased when their content is not
equally familiar to all groups. Item bias violates the assumption of measure-
ment invariance, which holds that measurement properties should not be
affected by the content of the test (Zumbo, 2009).
6 C. PRIMI ET AL.
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Regarding the CRT, several studies have measured and compared differen-
ces across genders, assuming the invariance of the test, although it has never
been empirically tested. The aim of Study 1 was to test the equivalence of the
CRT-L items across genders by exploring DIF within the Item Response Theory
(IRT) framework. The aim of the DIF analysis is to ascertain that, after control-
ling for the underlying construct, the response to an item is related to group
membership. If so, the item manifests DIF. For example, if the CRT-L exhibits
measurement invariance across genders, a randomly selected woman with a
specific level of cognitive reflection and a randomly selected man with the
same level of cognitive reflection should have the same chance of giving the
correct answer to an item. If this is not the case, DIF is present. In sum, the
aim of the current study was to test the invariance property of the CRT-L
across genders.
Methods
Participants
The participants were 838 students (52% female; mean age = 15.3 years;
SD = 4.03; 55% from secondary school; mean age = 12.55 years; SD = 0.71;
20% from high-school mean age = 16.27 years; SD = 1.5% and 25% attend-
ing university; mean age = 21.12 years; SD = 3.5). The adolescents were
recruited from secondary and high schools in a suburban area in Italy (Tus-
cany). A detailed study protocol that explained the goals and methodology
of the study was approved by the institutional review boards of each
school. Students received an information sheet, which assured them that
the data obtained would be handled confidentially and anonymously. All
university students were enrolled in the first year of a psychology course at
the University of Florence, and were recruited using opportunity sampling
from various lectures and seminars. All students participated on a voluntary
basis.
In the gender DIF analyses, the male group included 403 students (mean
age = 15.03, SD = 3.8; range = 11.08–42), and the female group 435 students
(mean age = 15.7, SD = 4.2; range = 11.08–45).5
Materials
The CRT-L (Primi et al., 2016) is an extended version of the CRT (Frederick,
2005) that consists of six questions. Although the questions are open-ended,
5In the female group, the age range was wider than in the male group due to a single participant who
was 45 years old. Comparing the means, the difference was significant with a small effect size (t(829) =
2.449, p < 0.05, d = 0.17).
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almost all participants produce either the correct response or a typical incor-
rect (i.e., heuristic) response. That is, the reasoning errors that people make
are very systematic. An example item is the following: “If three elves can wrap
three toys in one hour, how many elves are needed to wrap six toys in two
hours? [correct answer = 3 elves; heuristic answer = 6 elves].” To be able to
produce a correct response, participants have to display an outstanding abil-
ity to effectively monitor and correct their impulsive response tendencies. As
a result, it is only a small minority of participants who tend to give correct
responses to the tasks. Previous results (Primi et al., 2016) attested that the
CRT-L scale is more adequate for younger and less educated samples than
the original CRT. Cronbach’s alpha6 in the current study was 0.80.
Procedure
All students completed the test individually in a self-administered format in
the classroom. The task was briefly introduced, and instructions for comple-
tion were given. The answers were collected in a paper-and-pencil format.
Students were instructed to take as much time as they needed to complete
the task. The average administration time was about five minutes.
Data analysis
Preliminarily, we verified the assumption of unidimensionality in each group.
In the current study, using the x2LD statistic (Chen & Thissen, 1997) we tested
the presence of local dependence (LD), i.e., an excess of covariation among
item responses that is not accounted for by a unidimensional IRT model. Val-
ues of 10 or greater suggest the presence of a multifactorial structure. Other-
wise, it is possible to assume that there is a common factor underlying the
items. The fit of the IRT model was evaluated using the M2 statistic and the
associated root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) value. Like
other chi-square statistics, the M2 statistic is generally unrealistic because
there will be some error in any strong parametric model (Browne & Cudeck,
1993). Thus, the RMSEA provides a more appropriate metric for model error
(Cai, Maydeu-Olivares, Coffman, & Thissen, 2006). RMSEA values of 0.05 or
lower indicate good fit. Item parameters were estimated by employing the
marginal maximum-likelihood estimation method with the expectation–
maximisation algorithm (Bock, & Aitkin, 1981) implemented in IRTPRO (Cai,
Du Toit, & Thissen, 2011), and the item fit under the 2PL model was tested
computing the S-x2 statistics (Orlando & Thissen, 2000). As large samples lead
to a greater likelihood of significant chi-square differences, the critical value
6Reliability was 0.82 for males, and 0.76 for females.
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of p = 0.01, rather than p = 0.05, was used (Stone & Zhang, 2003). IRT models
assume that each examinee responding to a test item possesses some
amount of the underlying ability and at each level of ability there will be a cer-
tain probability, denoted by P(u), to give a correct answer to the item. This
approach derives the probability of each response as a function of the latent
trait and some item parameters. In the 2PL model, the two item parameters
are, respectively, item difficulty and item discrimination. The item difficulty
parameter (b) or “location” measured on the same scale of theta (that conven-
tionally has a mean of 0 and SD of 1.0), represents the latent trait level corre-
sponding to a 0.50 probability of correctly endorsing the item.
The item discrimination parameter (a) or “slope” represents the item’s abil-
ity to differentiate between people at contiguous levels of the latent trait.
This parameter describes how rapidly the probabilities change with trait lev-
els. In order to investigate the invariance property of the items of the scale,
analyses of DIF across genders were performed, applying an IRT likelihood
ratio test approach implemented in the IRTPRO software (Cai et al., 2011).
The DIF detection procedure is based on a nested model comparison
approach. For each item, two models are compared, one in which all parame-
ters (discrimination and difficulty) are constrained to be equal across groups,
and one with a separate estimation of all parameters. For each item, the fit of
a model constraining the item parameters to be equal between the two
groups was compared with a model allowing the parameters to be estimated
freely in the two groups. This procedure involves comparing differences in
log-likelihoods (distributed as chi-square) associated with nested models.
Since multiple tests were performed, Bonferroni corrections were used.
Results
Differential Item Functioning (DIF) across gender
The results confirmed that a single-factor model adequately represented the struc-
ture of the scale for each group, as none of the LD statistics were greater than 0.10.
The model showed a satisfactory fit (M2 = 16.70, df = 18, p = 0.54; RMSEA =
0.0001). Each item had a non-significant S-x2 value (Table 1), indicating that
all items fit under the 2PL model.
Concerning the difficulty parameters (b), the results showed that the
parameters ranged from ¡0.33 § 0.08 to 0.95 § 0.11 logit in the male group
and ¡0.39 § 0.06 to 0.87 § 0.15 logit in the female group across the contin-
uum of the latent trait. With regard to the discrimination parameters (a),
according to Baker and Kim (2004), (values 0.01–0.24 are very low, 0.25–0.64
are low, 0.65–1.34 are moderate, 1.35–1.69 are high, and more than 1.7 are
very high), all items showed high discrimination levels (a values over 1.35) in
each group (Table 1).
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In the DIF analyses (in which the male group was the reference group), we
found gender equivalence for both the discrimination (a) and the difficulty
(b) parameters, after Bonferroni corrections (p = 0.05/ 6 = 0.008) (Table 1).
Discussion
The results attested the measurement equivalence of the scale when adminis-
tered to male and female students. In other words, the same underlying con-
struct is measured in the two groups. This ensures that the CRT-L can be used to
compare males and females, and differences in scores across genders can be
interpreted in terms of group differences in the level of the underlying construct.
Study 2
As we described above, Zhang et al. (2016) found that gender differences in
cognitive reflection are explained by subjective numeracy. Nevertheless, it is
problematic to interpret this result, because the subjective numeracy scale
combines the measurement of participants’ self-reported ability and their
preference to work with numbers (Fagerlin et al., 2007). Indeed, it is not clear
if subjective numeracy should be considered a measure of numeracy, or if it is
more closely related to motivation, emotions and confidence involving the
use of numbers (cf. Liberali et al., 2012; Peters & Bjalkebring, 2015). Thus, for a
better understanding, it would be desirable to measure numeracy and math-
related emotions and attitudes separately.
Regarding the role of cognitive and affective factors in cognitive reflection,
Morsanyi et al. (2014) confirmed that both numerical skills and MA indepen-
dently predicted performance on the CRT. Specifically, they presented a
model, where numeracy/school math achievement partially mediated the
effect of MA on cognitive reflection (after the effect of test anxiety was con-
trolled). This model was tested both in a sample of female university students,
and in a sample of secondary school students. In the secondary school sam-
ple, gender was also included in the model as a covariate, and its effect on
cognitive reflection was found to be non-significant. That is, gender did not
explain additional variance in cognitive reflection, once the effects of MA and
math achievement were taken into account. Nevertheless, there was no gen-
der difference in cognitive reflection in this study, and Morsanyi et al. (2014)
did not investigate whether the effect of gender on CRT performance was
mediated by math skills, MA or both. Thus, the current study sought to repli-
cate the earlier findings regarding the role of math knowledge and MA in cog-
nitive reflection, and additionally test the hypothesis that math knowledge
and MA might mediate the effect of gender on cognitive reflection.
Additionally, instead of basic measures of numeracy, which are typically used
in studies that explore the links between numerical skills and performance on
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the CRT, in the current study, we measured more complex mathematical rea-
soning skills. In order to assess mathematical reasoning abilities comprehen-
sively, we used a combined score of two measures: a measure of probabilistic
reasoning skills (including the understanding of basic probabilities presented in
text and tables, reasoning about random sequences of events, and the ability
to resist some typical fallacies and biases) and a measure which was developed
to assess statistical literacy. Both measures require the application of mathemat-
ical/probabilistic reasoning in the context of everyday scenarios. However, the
first measure was developed to identify people who struggle with basic proba-
bilistic reasoning, whereas the latter measure is aimed at discriminating
between individuals with high levels of statistical reasoning ability. As a result
of combining the two scales, we obtained a measure that included items rang-
ing from relatively easy to very difficult, ensuring that participants’ mathemati-
cal reasoning skills were assessed with good precision.
Methods
Participants
The participants were 181 university students (mean age = 21.23 years, SD =
3.67) 33% male (mean age = 21.81 years, SD = 4.34) and 66% female (mean
age = 20.94 years, SD = 3.28)7 enrolled in the first year of a psychology course
at the University of Florence, and were recruited using opportunity sampling
from various lectures and seminars. All students participated on a voluntary
basis.
Materials
Cognitive reflection was measured by the Italian version of the CRT-L (Primi
et al., 2016) as in Study 1. In the present sample, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.76.
Measure of math anxiety. The Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale (AMAS;
Hopko, Mahadevan, Bare, & Hunt, 2003; Italian version: Primi, Busdraghi, Tom-
asetto, Morsanyi, & Chiesi, 2014) measures MA experienced by students in
learning and test situations (e.g., “Thinking about an upcoming math test one
day before”). Participants have to respond on the basis of how anxious they
would feel during the events specified, using a five-point response scale
(ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). High scores on the
scale indicate high MA. A single composite score was obtained, based on par-
ticipants’ ratings of each statement. In the present sample, Cronbach’s alpha
was 0.89.
7There was no age difference across genders (p=0.141).
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Measures of mathematical reasoning. The Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT, Cokely,
Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012) has been developed specifi-
cally for educated and highly educated samples (e.g., college students), is
composed of four questions (with an open-ended question format), and it
assesses statistical numeracy and risk literacy. In detail, the contents of the
items are about risks, presented in terms of ratio concepts, such as probabili-
ties, proportions and percentages (e.g., “Out of 1000 people in a small town
500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members in the choir 100 are
men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are men. What is
the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? Please
indicate the probability in per cent çççççç%). A single composite score
was computed based on the sum of correct responses. In the present sample,
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.50.
The Probabilistic Reasoning Scale (PRS, Primi, Morsanyi, Donati, Galli, &
Chiesi, 2017) has been designed to measure proportional reasoning and basic
probabilistic reasoning skills. The scale consists of 16 multiple-choice ques-
tions. The items include questions about simple, conditional and conjunct
probabilities, and the numerical data are presented in frequencies or percen-
tages (e.g., “A ball was drawn from a bag containing 10 red, 30 white, 20 blue,
and 15 yellow balls. What is the probability that it is neither red nor blue?” ( a)
30/75; (b) 10/75; (c) 45/75; and “60% of the population in a city are men and
40% are women. Fifty per cent of the men and 30% of the women smoke. We
select a person from the city at random. What is the probability that this per-
son is a smoker?” (a) 42%, (b) 50%, (c) 85%). A single composite score was
computed based on the sum of correct responses. Coefficient alpha for the
current sample was 0.72.
We obtained a measure of mathematical reasoning summing the trans-
formed z-scores of the BNT and PRS tests. This way, we obtained a measure
with a broad range of item difficulty: from easy to very difficult. The reliability
of the combined measure was 0.69.
Procedure
All students completed the measures individually in a self-administered format
in the classroom. Each task was briefly introduced, and instructions for comple-
tion were given. The answers were collected in a paper-and-pencil format. All
measures (the AMAS, PRS, BNT and CRT-L) were administered in a booklet in a
randomised order. There was about half an hour to complete the scales.
Data analysis
To investigate our hypothesis about the relationships between mathematical
reasoning, MA, gender and cognitive reflection, we computed Pearson
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correlations among these variables. To further enhance the understanding of
the mechanisms underlying the relationships among these variables, a media-
tion model was tested. To test our mediation hypothesis concerning the rela-
tionship between gender and cognitive reflection through MA and
mathematical reasoning, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS, which
allowed us to test a multiple-step multiple mediator model (Hayes, 2009). In
this model (Figure 1), path a1 and path a2 are, respectively, the regression
coefficients estimating MA and mathematical reasoning from gender, and
path b1 and path b2 are the regression coefficients estimating cognitive
reflection from MA and mathematical reasoning, respectively. Path a3 is the
regression coefficient estimating mathematical reasoning from MA. In this
model, three specific indirect effects of gender on cognitive reflection can be
quantified, i.e., the product of a1 £ b1, which assesses the indirect effect
through MA, and the product of a2 £ b2, that measures the indirect effect
through mathematical reasoning, and the product of a1 £ a3 £ b2, which
indicates the indirect effect through MA and mathematical reasoning in serial
(Figure 1). The sum of the three specific indirect effects corresponds to the
total indirect effect (see Brown, 1997).
A bootstrapping procedure (with 10,000 resamples) to estimate 95%
bias-corrected confidence intervals (BC 95% CI) was used. A BC 95% CI
that does not include zero provides evidence of a significant indirect
effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Bootstrapping is a resampling strategy
for estimation and hypothesis testing. With the bootstrapping method,
the sample is conceptualised as a pseudo-population that represents the
broader population from which the sample was derived, and the sam-
pling distribution of any statistic can be generated by calculating the sta-
tistic of interest in multiple resamples from the data-set. The
bootstrapping procedure has been suggested as representing the most
trustworthy test for assessing the effects of mediation models, overcom-
ing issues associated with inaccurate p-values that result from violations
of parametric assumptions (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013). Indeed, the boot-
strapping procedure is advantageous because it does not impose the
assumption of normality of the sampling distribution of indirect effects,
and it maintains high power while maintaining adequate control over
Type I error rate (Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, &
Sheets, 2002; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes,
2008).
Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the
CRT-L and the other measures. As expected, the CRT-L was negatively related
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to MA and positively related to the BNT and the PRS. The CRT also showed a
negative relation with gender: females scored lower on the CRT.
To explore the role of math reasoning skills andMA in the gender gap in CRT-L
performance, a mediation analysis was conducted with the bootstrapping
method with bias-corrected confidence estimates (Figure 2). Results showed that
whereas the total effect of gender on cognitive reflection was significant (p <
0.001), once themediators were entered into the analysis, the direct effect of gen-
der was no longer significant (p = 0.245). However, a significant total indirect
effect of gender on cognitive reflection was found (point estimate = ¡0.980, BC
95% CI = ¡1.363 to ¡0.638). In detail, the results showed a significant indirect
effect of gender on cognitive reflection throughMA (point estimate =¡0.149, BC
95% CI = ¡0.343 to ¡0.025) and mathematical reasoning (point estimate =
¡0.068, BC 95% CI =¡0.177 to¡0.013), and through MA and mathematical rea-
soning in serial (point estimate =¡0.763, BC 95% CI =¡1.121 to¡0.479).
Table 2. Correlations between the CRT-L, gender, the BNT, probabilistic reasoning ability
and maths anxiety.
CRT-L BNT PRS Maths Reasoning AMAS Gender
1 CRT-L
2 BNT 0.42***
3 PRS 0.55*** 0.38***.
4 Maths Reasoning 0.59*** 0.83*** 0.83***
4 AMAS ¡0.39*** ¡0.23** ¡0.24** ¡0.29***
5 Gender ¡0.33*** ¡0.41*** ¡0.32*** ¡0.44*** 0.16*
M 2.82 1.10 12.51 0 26.36
SD 1.86 1.03 2.42 1 7.92
Note: Males coded as 1; females coded as 2. CRT-L: Cognitive Reflection Test – Long; BNT: Berlin
Numeracy Test; PRS: Probabilistic Reasoning Scale, Maths Reasoning (the combined z scores of the
BNS and PRS); AMAS: Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale.
***p < 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05.
Figure 2. Multiple-step multiple mediator model with gender as independent variable,
math anxiety and mathematical reasoning as simultaneous mediators, and cognitive
reflection as a dependent variable.
Note: Path values represent unstandardized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. Dotted
line (c) represents the total effect of gender on cognitive reflection, i.e., the effect prior to the inclusion
of the mediating variables. The c’ value represents the direct effect of gender on cognitive reflection, i.
e., the effect of gender on cognitive reflection after the mediators are included. p < 0.05; p < 0.01;
p < 0.001.
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Discussion
The results confirmed that, in line with several previous studies (e.g., Campi-
telli & Gerrans, 2014; Cueva et al., 2016; Frederick, 2005; Pennycook et al.,
2016; Primi et al., 2016), gender was related to performance on the CRT (i.e.,
men scored significantly higher than women). However, the gender differen-
ces disappeared when numerical skills and math-related anxiety were statisti-
cally controlled. Although the CRT is more than just a test of numeracy (e.g.,
Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Liberali et al., 2012), these results suggest that the
numerical content of the problems acts as a confounding variable .
Regarding the role of MA in cognitive reflection, a previous study (Morsa-
nyi et al., 2014) showed that highly math anxious individuals responded more
quickly (and less accurately) to CRT problems than participants with low levels
of anxiety. This might be interpreted as a strategy to avoid the uncomfortable
situation of having to solve numerical problems (see e.g., Ashcraft & Krause,
2007). This tendency might explain why math-anxious people are more likely
to give incorrect heuristic responses. In other words, the desire to finish the
“math task” as soon as possible might prevent them from engaging in more
in-depth reasoning and reflection, which is necessary to reach the correct
solution. Additionally, previous studies (see Suarez-Pellicioni, Nu~nez-Pe~na, &
Colome, 2016, for a review) have shown attentional control problems in high
math-anxious individuals, especially in inhibitory tasks (Stroop tasks), which
could also explain the tendency to rely on salient heuristics. Indeed, several
authors have noted that inhibition of the easily available heuristic response is
necessary for correct performance on the CRT (e.g., B€ockenholt, 2012; Campi-
telli & Gerrans, 2014; Travers et al., 2016). Morsanyi et al. (2014) also explored
the possibility that MA affected performance on the CRT through burdening
working memory resources. Although both anxiety and working memory
load were associated with poorer performance on the CRT, only anxiety (but
not working memory load) was associated with faster RTs and lower levels of
confidence in responses. For this reason, it was concluded that the effects of
anxiety and working memory load were only partially overlapping.
Previous studies have provided evidence for the role of both numeracy
and MA/math-related attitudes in performance on the CRT. Some studies
have also linked these findings to gender differences in cognitive reflection
(Morsanyi et al., 2014; Primi et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). Nevertheless,
these studies did not investigate whether the effect of gender on CRT perfor-
mance was mediated by math skills, MAor both. Additionally, the mediation
analysis that was run in the current study also provided some novel informa-
tion regarding the roles of math reasoning skills and MA. In particular, this
model showed that there was a direct link between MA and cognitive reflec-
tion, but the effect of MA on cognitive reflection was also partially mediated
by mathematical reasoning. In sum, the mathematics requirements of the
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CRT explained gender differences in cognitive reflection – a supposedly
domain-general trait – and when these factors were controlled, men and
women did not differ in their level of cognitive reflection. This finding is in
line with Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) who did not find a gender differ-
ence in the case of their new version of the CRT (CRT-2), a test that did not
require numerical computations.
Ideally, reflectivity should be measured independent of numerical skills
and anxiety. Nevertheless, it is not clear if a non-numerical test of cognitive
reflection would still be as closely related to decision-making skills as the orig-
inal CRT or the CRT-L. For example, in Thomson and Oppenheimer’s (2016)
study, the correlations between the CRT-2 and various measures of decision-
making skills and rational thinking were generally weaker than the correla-
tions between these measures and the original CRT. Indeed, most heuristics
and biases tasks and a large proportion of the commonly used decision-mak-
ing competence measures (e.g., the tasks measuring framing effects, the con-
sideration of sample sizes, base rates, intertemporal preferences, risk seeking,
etc.) include numerical information. It is also true that many important real-
life decisions (including decisions about financial investments, health insur-
ance, pension schemes and medical treatments) require a good level of statis-
tical literacy.
Conclusion
Study 1 attested the measurement equivalence of the CRT-L when adminis-
tered to male and female participants. Thus, the observed gender differences
in cognitive reflection are actual differences and they do not reflect a bias in
the measurement process. Although the test measures the same construct in
both males and females, the results of Study 2 suggest that numerical skills
and math-related feelings, such as MA, are strongly correlated with perfor-
mance on the CRT. Given that men often outperform women on math reason-
ing tasks and they show less anxiety, this finding is problematic for studies
that seek to measure reflectivity independently of quantitative skills. One
solution to this problem could be to measure cognitive reflection indepen-
dent of math skills (e.g., Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). Nevertheless, this
line of work needs further validation, and it would also be advantageous to
develop additional tasks for this purpose, which covers a broader range of dif-
ficulty levels. Another possible solution to this issue could be to use math
skills as a covariate when looking at the relations between the CRT and other
measures in order to be able to distinguish between the effects of reflection
and numeracy. Nevertheless, in this case, the results would strongly depend
on the choice of numeracy measure. Future studies should aim to explore fur-
ther the role of reflectivity and numerical skills in distinguishing between
competent and incompetent decision makers. Additionally, these studies
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could also confirm whether gender differences disappear when reflectivity is
measured independently of quantitative skills.
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